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 Consensus Beliefs, Information Acquisition,
 and Market Information Efficiency
 By ROBERT E. VERRECCHIA*
 In an attempt to provide a precise analyti-
 cal interpretation for the notion of "infor-
 mation efficiency" introduced by Eugene
 Fama (1970), Mark Rubinstein suggests that
 a necessary and sufficient condition for an
 individual to perceive all his information
 fully reflected in prices is that he have "con-
 sensus beliefs." That is, consensus beliefs
 are those beliefs which, if held by all indi-
 viduals in an otherwise similar economy,
 would generate the same equilibrium prices
 as in the actual heterogeneous economy.
 However, the notion of information ef-
 ficiency embodied in Rubinstein's discus-
 sion has been more broadly interpreted as
 follows.' A market is efficient with respect
 to an information set A, say, if the prices it
 generates are identical to those generated in
 an otherwise identical economy in which the
 set A accurately describes the information
 available to each and every market par-
 ticipant; the common, or homogeneous, be-
 lief induced by knowledge of A is the con-
 sensus belief.2
 If the set of information A happens to be
 the union of the information sets privately
 available to each and every market par-
 ticipant, then efficiency with respect to A
 can be characterized as a situation in which
 the consensus belief is at least as correct an
 assessment (on the basis of A) as the assess-
 ment privately held by any single investor.
 Stated more informally, all investors per-
 ceive that no less information is fully re-
 flected in prices than that which each indi-
 vidual investor privately knows. With regard
 to welfare implications, when the consensus
 belief is at least as correct, investors face a
 type of fair game in the market. That is, let
 "excess returns" be defined as the difference
 in the expected utility some well-informed
 investor achieves by trading at a price which
 reflects information inferior to his own vis-
 a-vis the expected utility he achieves when
 price reflects information at least as good.
 Then a price reflecting no less information
 than what is privately known prohibits ex-
 cess returns. In effect, prices provide an
 effective barrier to the exploitation of less
 well-informed investors by better-informed
 investors, because no investor can exploit
 his superior information (in the classical
 price - taking setting usually attributed
 to a securities market) whenever a price
 exists which reflects information which is in
 no way inferior to his own.3
 *Graduate School of Business, University of
 Chicago.
 1See, for example, Avraham Beja, William Beaver,
 and my 1979b paper.
 2For example, suppose that a market consisted of
 two investors, the first of whom had as his sole source
 of information a set 0, say, which contained only
 optimistic bits and pieces of data about a security, and
 which consequently induced him to regard the future
 return of the security as "abnormally high." Alterna-
 tively, the second investor had as his sole source of
 information a set P, say, which contained only pessi-
 mistic bits and pieces of data about the security, and
 which consequently induced him to regard the future
 return of the security as "abnormally low." Suppose
 further that trading against one another in the market
 resulted in a price that appeared to reflect the fact that
 the future return for the security would be "average";
 this is a natural supposition if both traders have equal
 weight in the market with regard to the supply and
 demand of the security. Now if in an otherwise identi-
 cal market the set of information A, where A is the
 union of 0 and P, is substituted for both traders'
 original private sources, 0 and P, respectively, and if
 this knowledge induces them to regard the future re-
 turn of the security as average, then this will likely
 cause no price change since prices have already aver-
 aged out their diverse opinions. Thus the market for the
 security will be efficient with respect to A, where A is
 the union of 0 and P.
 3To illustrate this, consider the situation described
 in fn. 2 in which one investor knows 0, and another
 knows P. Suppose that a third investor enters the
 market who happens to know A, the union of 0 and P.
 Clearly, the third investor is "better informed" than
 either of the other two, where it will be assumed
 874
This content downloaded from 165.123.108.195 on Tue, 18 Oct 2016 17:59:21 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 VOL. 70 NO. S VERRECCHIA: CONSENSUS BELIEFS 875
 In brief, the consensus belief concept is
 an intuitively plausible definition of market
 information efficiency which, unlike some
 of its competitors, lends itself to formal
 analyses. The purpose of this paper is to
 consider its robustness. For example, it is
 well known that prices are determined in
 part by a type of geometric averaging of
 each investor's assessment weighted by his
 tolerance for risk. Therefore, efficiency with
 respect to the union of investors' private
 information sets can be loosely described as
 a phenomenon in which the consensus belief
 implied by this geometric average is at least
 as correct as any assessment that contrib-
 utes to the average. But there is no intrinsic
 reason why this should be the case: if two
 bettors have an opinion as to which horse
 will win a race, and one bettor's opinion is
 vastly superior to the other's (because of the
 time and expense invested in formulating
 that opinion), there may be no averaging of
 their opinions that will be superior to that of
 the more sagacious bettor.
 This is the problem. If one investor is
 motivated to invest in the acquisition of
 information, it is within reason that he could
 achieve an assessment that is more accurate
 than that implied by the consensus belief,
 despite the fact that his assessment is among
 those that are impounded in price. To
 achieve a better understanding of this prob-
 lem, it can be modeled along the following
 lines. Suppose that the mental process of
 determining an assessment of the return of a
 security is thought of as analogous to the
 statistical process of determining an esti-
 mate of some unknown parameter. That is,
 suppose that at the end of a future period,
 nature will draw from an urn a numbered
 ball that represents the return on the secur-
 ity. For the benefit of this discussion, it will
 be assumed that numbers on the balls are
 normally distributed in the urn with known
 variance and unknown mean. Before trad-
 ing occurs, however, investors can draw
 sample observations from this urn; the
 observations are private information sets,
 and A can represent the union of these sets.
 With his private observations, each investor
 forms an estimate of the unknown mean
 which, in turn, determines his individual
 assessment. Then the consensus belief is at
 least as accurate as any single investor's
 assessment whenever the precision (where
 precision is defined to be the inverse of the
 variance) of the estimate of the return im-
 plicit in the consensus belief is greater than
 or equal to the precision in any single inves-
 tor's estimate. This, in turn, implies that the
 market is efficient with respect to A, the
 union of investors' information sets.
 The subsequent analysis considers the be-
 havior of investors with different tolerances
 for risk in this situation. What is demon-
 strated is that whenever all investors acquire
 what each perceives to be an optimal quan-
 tum of information (in the form of sample
 observations), the degree of precision im-
 plicit in the consensus belief is indeed no
 less than the degree of precision in a single
 investor's estimate. This result implies that
 the Fama-Rubinstein insight as to what con-
 stitutes information efficiency is robust in
 that it evolves naturally from the behavior
 of investors operating in their own self-
 interests. The fact that it is robust suggests
 that it may provide a more viable and inter-
 esting characterization than competing theo-
 ries.4 The following analysis formally dem-
 onstrates this result. without controversy that possession of more informa-
 tion signifies being better informed. The only way
 investors interact in a market is through prices; i.e., an
 equilibrium price is established for a security on the
 basis of investors' expectations, and at this price inves-
 tors exchange holdings of the security. Therefore, when
 the price the third investor encounters is the same price
 that would prevail if each and every investor knew A,
 and in our previous example this was the case, there is
 no way he (the third investor) can earn an excess return
 (as I have narrowly defined the term) on the basis of A,
 despite the fact that it represents information superior
 to that available to the two other investors.
 4The chief competing theory is one of "rational
 expectations." A recent survey article by Sanford
 Grossman provides a comprehensive guide to this work.
 The theory of rational expectations provides a particu-
 larly elegant argument for what constitutes market
 information efficiency. However it is also fragile in that
 it relies on a number of assumptions, such as the
 absence of "noise" (i.e., indiscernable randomness),
 which may not be met in a situation embodying the full
 complexity of a real world setting. Furthermore, it is a
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 I. A Description of the Market
 To initiate the analysis, consider an inves-
 tor i who trades in a market which offers
 the opportunity to purchase an unlimited
 amount of a risk-free security denoted by
 SF, or a risky security denoted by SR, whose
 total supply is SR. At the end of some future
 period, investment in the risk-free security
 yields a fixed return of F units of wealth for
 each unit of SF purchased, and investment
 in the risky security yields an uncertain re-
 turn of R units of wealth for each unit of SR
 purchased. At the beginning of a trading
 period, investor i will choose an amount SF
 and S' of the risk-free and risky security,
 respectively, which maximizes his expected
 utility subject to his initial wealth, which is
 denoted by W'. That is, investor i chooses
 an amount SF and SR of the risk-free and
 risky security, respectively, to maximize his
 utility when SF and SR yield their respective
 returns.
 Before trading, an investor also has the
 opportunity to acquire information. The
 information acquisition process will be char-
 acterized as a sampling process from a nor-
 mal probability distribution.5 That is, sup-
 pose that R is assumed to be some real
 number which is initially known to all inves-
 tors to be normally distributed with mean mii
 and precision h (where precision is defined
 to be the inverse of the variance - 1).6 The
 acquisition of additional information is
 characterized as a sample of a prede-
 termined size n consisting of the observation
 of random variables X1,..., Xn, about which
 it is known initially that each is indepen-
 dently and identically distributed normally
 with mean R and precision h. Then it is well
 known (see Morris DeGroot, p. 167) that
 conditional on the observed sample values
 xl,..., x, an investor regards the distribu-
 tion of R to be normal with mean
 A h~i~i+ nhm
 m=.
 h
 and precision h = h+ nh
 n
 where m= k
 k= n
 is the observed mean of the sample. It will
 also be assumed that each investor's ob-
 servations are distributed independently of
 the observations of any other investor.
 The sample mean itself, however, is not
 known until the information has been
 processed; prior to its revelation, it is a
 random variable. Its unconditional distribu-
 tion can be determined as follows. Condi-
 tional upon knowledge of R, m is normally
 distributed with mean R and precision nh,
 because it is the mean of n sample observa-
 tions, each of which is normally distributed
 about R with mean h. An investor's initial
 or prior belief about R is that it is normal-
 ly distributed with mean mi and precision h.
 Thus, it can be shown that the uncondi-
 tional distribution of m is a normal proba-
 bility distribution with mean imi and preci-
 sion nhh/h.7
 It will also be assumed that investor i has
 a (negative) exponential utility function of
 notion of efficiency which is stronger than that sug-
 gested by Fama (1976), or implied by the empirical
 evidence concerning the existence of efficiency in the
 semistrong form.
 3This characterization of information acquisition is
 suggested by Robert Wilson, p. 191.
 6It should be emphasized that while prior assess-
 ments are identical, it is assumed that each investor
 arrives at the assessment mI independent of other inves-
 tors. This allows these prior assessments to be treated
 as though they were independent sample observations
 about R, each with precision h.
 7This result can be explained, intuitively, by noting
 that mi is simply the mean of the prior distribution of
 R, and nhh/) is equal to
 nhh [h+nh ]=[I+l]'
 h L nhh | Lnh h
 That is, the precision nhh/h is simply the inverse of the
 sum of the variance (nh)- I of the conditional distribu-
 tion of the sample mean for any given value of R, and
 the variance h-I of the prior distribution of R. In
 effect, m is normally distributed with the mean inves-
 tors attribute to R before they process the information,
 mii, and precision which, in a broad sense, represents
 the precision of their prior beliefs plus the precision of
 the information itself.
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 the form
 Ui( w) =rie- (11r,)w
 for wealth w, where ri>O. The coefficient
 1/ri is investor i's coefficient of risk aver-
 sion; its inverse ri is referred to as his coeffi-
 cient of risk tolerance. The purpose in as-
 suming utility functions of this form is that
 it permits a consensus belief to be explicitly
 determined.8 The extent to which the results
 of the analysis depend upon this assumption
 is not entirely clear. However, as the discus-
 sion unfolds, it becomes clear that the sali-
 ent feature of the analysis is the relationship
 between degrees of risk tolerance and infor-
 mation acquisition activities; therefore, it is
 reasonable to conjecture that the form of
 the utility function assumes no more than a
 secondary role, provided that it evidences
 global risk aversion.9
 When investor i enters the market at the
 beginning of the period, he encounters the
 following problem. If the cost associated
 with making n sample observations is repre-
 sented by a function C(n) (which is as-
 sumed to be a twice differentiable function
 of n), investor i must choose
 1) an optimal number of sample ob-
 servations, and
 2) based upon the information in those
 observations, as well as his prior informa-
 tion, an optimal amount SR' and SF of risky
 and risk-free securities, respectively, so as to
 maximize his future period expected utility;
 and, of course, his choices must be con-
 strained by his initial wealth.
 Suppose that a unit of the risk-free and
 risky security sell in the market for 1 and P
 units of wealth, respectively (i.e., the price
 of a risk-free security is a numeraire). Inves-
 tor i's choice problem can be characterized
 mathematically as choosing those elements
 n, SF, SR that
 (1) max |rie- el/r{FSF+RSR)
 {n, SF, SRm R
 * dN(m m, h') dN(iim, nhk-lh )
 subject to Wi = SF + PSR + C(n), where
 dN(,u, p) denotes a normal density function
 with mean ft and precision p.
 For example, consider optimal amounts
 of SF and SR' conditional upon the choice of
 n sample observations. Conditional upon n,
 (1) reduces to solving the Lagrangian equa-
 tion
 L(SF, SR, X)=-f 4el/ri{FSF+RSR)dN( mh)
 +X{ W'- (SF+ PSR + C(n))}
 Differentiating L with respect to SR yields
 (2)
 aL J Re l/ri{FSF+RSR)dN(, h )-XP
 Differentiating L with respect to SF yields
 -a Fe lri{FSF+RSR)dN(m )
 Necessary first - order conditions require
 aL/aSR= aL/aSF= 0 in (2) and (3). Thus
 the two equations can be combined to yield
 Re-1/ri{FSF+RSR) dN( h, )
 (4) p=-
 Fe- F1/ri{FSF+RSR) dN( mh)
 Recognizing that for any parameter a,
 -aR dN(i, v) = e-a+a2/2vdN(,u- v)
 and using a common property of the mo-
 ment generating function of a normal dis-
 8The existence of a consensus belief, however, can
 be established even in the absence of an explicit de-
 termination. See my 1979b paper.
 9 Note that the assumption of constant risk toler-
 ance implies that an investor's tolerance for risk is
 independent of his wealth. However, if one postulates
 that risk tolerance increases as wealth increases, inves-
 tors with large constant risk tolerance can be thought
 to assume the role of investors with large wealth.
This content downloaded from 165.123.108.195 on Tue, 18 Oct 2016 17:59:21 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 878 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW DECEMBER 1980
 tribution, it can be shown that (4) reduces to
 (5)
 JRdN ( R,T h
 ri h / m-(SR/rlh)
 F dN( ^ S F
 Rearranging terms yields the amount of the
 risky security investor i demands,
 (6) S=rIhrm {-FP}
 Suppose it is assumed, however, that
 investor i is representative of all other
 investors in the market; specifically, each
 investor j, say, has a utility for wealth char-
 acterized by a constant tolerance for risk rj
 and an assessment of the distribution of R
 which is normal with mean mj and precision
 h =h+njh (where n. is investorj's optimal
 number of sample observations). Then sum-
 ming (6) over the demand of all investors
 yields
 N
 (7) h r1h1m -v0FP
 i= 1
 where N is the total number of investors,
 N
 i= 1
 is the sum of the precision in each investor's
 assessment of the unknown mean weighted




 represents the total supply of risky securi-
 ties. Finally (7) implies
 (8) F I z ( SR
 The expression derived in (8) is the market-
 clearing or equilibrium price of the risky
 security SR, assuming that the price of the
 risk-free security is set at one.
 II. Consensus Beliefs and Market
 Information Efficiency
 To provide some intuition, the expression
 for P in (8) can be interpreted as the ratio of
 1) the sum of each investor's assess-
 ment or estimate of the unknown mean of
 the return for R, m6, weighted by the coeffi-
 cient rihi/vo, and adjusted by a factor of
 supply represented by - ST/vO, to
 2) the known fixed return of the risk-
 free security F.
 Using the definition of a consensus belief
 (see Rubinstein or my 1979b paper), it is a
 simple exercise to show that the expression
 is a consensus belief. This is because this
 expression is precisely that belief, or esti-
 mate, of the unknown mean of R, which, if
 held by all investors in some otherwise iden-
 tical market, would effect a market-clearing
 price identical to the one derived in (8).1o
 Consider the variance of the consensus
 belief. Assuming that each sample observa-
 tion made by an investor is independent of
 all other observations made by all other
 investors, as well as those other observations
 made by himself, the variance of the con-
 sensus belief is
 (9)
 Var[ i E Vo Var
 = E ( v)2h
 N 2 = E r; hi
 '0Specifically, it can be shown that if each investor
 regarods the distribution of R to be normal with mean
 I(r,h1/vO)mi' and precision vo/(Iri), a price identical
 to the one in equation (8) obtains.
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 remembering that the ri hi are all constant.11
 As discussed heuristically in the introduc-
 tion, the notion of market information
 efficiency that underlies the concept of a
 consensus belief is that the variance in the
 consensus belief assessment of uncertainty
 (in this case the un-known mean of R) is less
 than or equal to the variance in each inves-
 tor's personal assessment. (This, of course,
 implies that the precision in the consensus
 belief is at least as great as the precision in
 each investor's assessment.) Since the vari-
 ance of the consensus belief assessment is
 given by (9), and the variance of each inves-
 tor's assessment is given by hJ 1, this can be
 expressed formally as the requirement that
 for each investor j, j = 1,..., N,
 (10) E hiN(h)
 The interesting question is under what
 circumstances the expression in (10) would
 hold. Casual observation of (10) suggests
 that if investors with large risk tolerance
 have little precision in their assessments,
 and vice versa, then the variance in the
 consensus belief will be large, because in
 effect poor assessments are given greater
 weight in determining the consensus belief
 than good assessments. Therefore, for (10)
 to hold, it must be that investors with greater
 risk tolerance somehow contribute better
 assessments to determining the market-
 clearing price than investors with lower risk
 tolerance. The next section considers how
 investors choose an optimal degree of preci-
 sion on the basis of their risk tolerance, and
 suggests a circumstance in which the ap-
 propriate behavior results.
 III. A Sufficient Condition to Ensure
 Information Efficiency
 The characterization of market efficiency
 implied by the consensus belief interpreta-
 tion requires that equation (10) hold. The
 validity of equation (10) is demonstrated in
 a number of steps. First, a function H(r) is
 introduced to represent an investor's opti-
 mal degree of precision as a function of his
 tolerance for risk through the relationship
 H(r) =h =h+no(r)h
 where no(r) represents the optimal number
 of sample observations an investor requires
 as a function of his risk tolerance. Second,
 in this section, it is demonstrated that a
 sufficient condition that equation (10) hold
 is that H(r) is a nondecreasing function of
 r; that is, each investor's optimal degree of
 precision is a nondecreasing function of his
 risk tolerance. Finally, the fact that H(r) is
 indeed a nondecreasing function of r is
 demonstrated in the next section.
 If it is assumed that H(r) is nondecreas-
 ing, proving the validity of equation (10) is
 straightforward. To begin, consider the in-
 vestor whose risk tolerance is no less than
 the risk tolerance of any investor in the
 market; this investor is referred to as in-
 vestor k. That is, rk > ri for all i. This implies
 that for all i,
 N
 riH(rk) < rkH(rk) < r, rH( ri)-=_vo
 i=lI
 which in turn implies that for all i,
 V0
 (11) H(rk)<?
 However, for equation (10) to be valid for
 investor k, it must be that






 Substituting the inequality in (11) into the
 " This also requires that each investor's prior assess-
 ment of the mean of R, imI is arrived at independent of
 other investors. See fn. 6.
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 left-hand side of (12) yields
 r12H(ri)H(rk ) ri2H(ri) vo
 Ea 2 <AL 2
 i=l vO i=I vo ri
 N ri H(ri)
 i=lIt
 which implies (12). Thus, the degree of pre-
 cision in investor k 's assessment is no greater
 than the degree of precision in the con-
 sensus belief assessment.
 But note that if H(r) is a nondecreasing
 function of r, then it must be that for all
 i, H(rk)> H(ri). That is, investor k attains a
 degree of precision that is no less than the
 degree attained by anyone else in the market.
 Consequently, no one else in the market has
 a degree of precision which is greater than
 the degree of precision in the consensus
 belief assessment, which ensures equation
 (10). In brief, market information efficiency
 holds in the sense of (10) whenever each
 investor attains as an optimal degree of pre-
 cision a level which is a nondecreasing func-
 tion of his risk tolerance.
 It remains to show that H(r) is a nonde-
 creasing function. However, even in the ab-
 sence of the analysis performed below, one
 would intuitively expect this to be the case.
 This is because investors with greater risk
 tolerance invest a greater proportion of their
 wealth in the risky security relative to inves-
 tors with the same wealth and the same
 values for mean and precision, but with
 lower tolerances for risk. For example, this
 relationship can be seen from the expression
 for investor demand derived in (6):
 SR = rih1 {imi - FP)
 Therefore to safeguard their increased
 amount of investment in the risky security,
 one might reasonably expect risk tolerant
 investors to acquire more information. This
 is shown in the next section.
 IV. Optimal Sampling Sizes
 In this section it is formally demonstrated
 that no(r) is a nondecreasing function of r;
 that is, an investor's optimal number of
 sample observations is a nondecreasing
 function of his risk tolerance. Since the opti-
 mal degree of precision is a linear function
 of the optimal sample size, this implies that
 the optimal degree of precision is a nonde-
 creasing function as well.
 To show that no(r) is a nondecreasing
 function of r, an expression for equation (1)
 is needed. Recall that since it was shown
 that SR= ri h{tm-FP} and SF= W'-C(n )-
 PSRJ are optimal amounts of the risky and
 risk-free security, respectively, (1) can be
 expressed as
 max G(n, r)
 {n}
 subject to W= SF+ PSR+ C(n)
 where G(n, r)
 L | re-F/r{W-C(n))-h{R-FP){?-FP)
 X dN(rm, hi) dN(iim, nhI/h )
 and the i sub- and superscripts used to iden-
 tify investor i are also dropped to ease the
 notational burden. That is, G(n, r) is the
 expected utility an investor with risk toler-
 ance r achieves when he chooses to make n
 sample observations.
 Using the properties of a normal moment
 generating function discussed above, inte-
 gration with respect to R yields
 (13)
 G(n, r)=f _re-F/r{W-C(n)I-2h{P-FP)2
 m
 x dN(fim, nhi/h )
 As a means of integrating the expression in
 (13), let the variable y be introduced, where
 y is defined as
 y = (nh/i/h)'12{m-m}
 which implies dy= (nhK/)'lh dm
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 Also note that a priori an investor does
 not know what value P will assume. It will
 be assumed here that each investor will be-
 have as if he believes that price will simply
 reflect the ratio of what all investors know
 initially about the expected return for R,
 i.e., mi, to the risk-free return F; that is, all
 investors will behave as if they believe that
 P=mii/F. Stated differently, investors act as
 if prices reflect only what is already well
 known, and not (among other things) their
 own additional information acquisition ac-
 tivities, or the information acquisition activ-
 ities of others.'2 This assumption is con-
 sistent with the notion that as price takers in
 a traditional market setting, investors be-
 have as if they perceive no relationship be-
 tween their own activities and price. Ana-
 lytically, this assumption implies (with some
 algebraic manipulation) that
 h {m-FP}2= {(nh)2/h} {m-m }2
 = {nh/h}y2
 where the variable y is used as a substitu-
 tion.
 It can be shown that a further substitu-
 tion of y in place of the variable m trans-
 forms (13) into
 G(n, r)
 f |-re'/'{~'FW-C(n))- 1/2(1 +(nh/h))ly y
 which, when integrated using properties of a
 normal probability distribution, yields
 G(n, r)= -r(h-lh^) /e-/{-(
 With an expression for G(n, r) now avail-
 able, define a function no(r) which repre-
 sents the value of n which maximizes G(n, r)
 for each value of r. The function no(r)
 represents the optimal number of sample
 observations an investor should acquire
 when his risk tolerance is r. It is necessary
 to show that no(r) is a nondecreasing func-
 tion of r. This is done using the above
 expression for G(n, r).
 Allowing the derivative with respect to n
 to be denoted by an asterisk, observe that
 G*(n,r)= {C*(n)- h(nh+h )
 x G(n, r)
 since
 a ov Whl/2- _(h)1/2h( h+)3/2
 =2 h(nh+h) lh/h)/
 Assuming that C(n) is a strictly increasing
 function of n, a necessary first-order condi-
 tion for maximization requires that no(r)
 satisfy
 (14) C*(no(r))= rh
 2F(no(r)h + )
 since in this case G* =0. Furthermore,
 (15) G**(n,r)
 =F C**(n)+ Ih2(nh+h)2} G(n, r)
 + (FC*(n) -'Ih(nh+hF }G(n, r)
 Therefore, a sufficient second-order condi-
 tion for maximization is that for all n,
 (16) r C**(n) + 2 h (nh+h)>o
 since in this case G is a concave function.
 (Concavity follows from the fact that G(n, r)
 is negative for all n and r, and the expres-
 sions in (15) which precede those of G(n, r)
 are both positive; thus G** is negative
 12This assumption is incompatible with theories,
 such as that of rational expectations, which rely sub-
 stantially upon investors' ability to decode prices, or
 infer the information acquired by others through prices,
 over time (see Grossman). In effect, it suggests that
 investors evidence somewhat myopic behavior. Its ad-
 vantage is that it may describe what occurs in an actual
 market setting.
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 whenever (16) holds.) Of course, maximiza-
 tion also requires that there is sufficient
 wealth for an investor to achieve this opti-
 mum, i.e.,
 PSR+ C(nO(r)) < W
 But this will also be assumed since we are
 specifically concerned with the circumstance
 in which each investor achieves his optimal
 sample size.'3
 As an aside, note that while (16) does not
 require that the cost function is convex, for
 all practical purposes it does since otherwise
 a counterexample to the claim that G is
 concave can likely be constructed by an
 appropriate choice of parameters. This limi-
 tation notwithstanding, consider the objec-
 tive of a cost function more generally. For
 equation (10) to hold, the cost function must
 prohibit a low-risk-tolerant investor from
 attaining a greater degree of precision than
 a high-risk-tolerant investor, or else the (ge-
 ometric) average of their precisions may no
 longer exceed the precision of the investor
 with greatest precision. Increasing marginal
 cost of increased sampling is one circum-
 stance which achieves this.
 Finally, we demonstrate that the behavior
 of an optimal number of sample observa-
 tions, as expressed in equation (14), is suffi-
 cient to imply that no(r) is a nondecreasing
 function of r. Assuming that no is differen-
 tiable with respect to r, differentiating both
 sides of (14) yields (where differentiation
 with respect to r is denoted by a prime):
 C**(no) *nlO
 h 1 rhn' |
 2F{(noh+h) (noh+h4 J
 or, rearranging terms,
 h
 2 F( n0h+ i)
 (17) n'O= h2
 C**(no) + rh
 2F(noh+h)
 But the numerator of (17) is clearly non-
 negative because all its terms are; the de-
 nominator is positive under the assumption
 ensuring concavity of G expressed in (16).
 Therefore, n' is a positive function of r,
 which implies that n0 is (at least) a nonde-
 creasing function of r.
 The fact that no(r) is nondecreasing im-
 mediately implies that H(r) is also nonde-
 creasing through the relationship
 H'(r) = n'(r)h
 In summary, if each investor can attain his
 optimal precision by acquiring his optimal
 number of sample observations, the degree
 of precision will be a nondecreasing func-
 tion of his risk tolerance. As discussed pre-
 viously, this behavior is sufficient to ensure
 that a market is informationally efficient in
 that equation (10) holds.
 V. Conclusion
 The interesting elements of any char-
 acterization of information efficiency are
 those conditions that are sufficient to induce
 it. This analysis attempts to point out that
 although there is no intrinsic reason why the
 geometric averaging performed by prices
 should yield an assessment (i.e., the con-
 sensus belief) which is no less precise than
 the individual assessments which contribute
 to the average, it holds whenever all inves-
 tors acquire what each perceives to be an
 optimal quantum of information in the pres-
 ence of some common cost function. For
 example, suppose that publicly available in-
 formation is thought of as an urn from
 which investors make sample observations
 at some cost (in wealth, time, or effort).
 Then, within the context of the notion of
 market efficiency discussed here, a market
 efficient with respect to all publicly avail-
 able information would naturally result; suf-
 ficient conditions would require no more
 than that investors act in their own self-
 interest. But, investors acting in their own
 self-interest is an assumption common to
 most discussions of competitive markets.
 Therefore, this interpretation of market in-
 formation efficiency may imply a phenome-
 ' Note that given the nature of each investor's
 choice problem, the nonnegative amount W-PSR-
 C(n) which remains after n and SR are selected is
 simply that amount allocated to investment in the
 risk-free security.
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 non that arises naturally from the market
 process.
 Of course, there are a number of assump-
 tions made in this analysis that limit gener-
 alization. Most significantly, it is assumed
 that investors face a common cost function
 which, although not necessarily convex, may
 approximate that requirement. A further re-
 striction, but less obvious in its impact, is
 the assumption that all investors have con-
 stant risk tolerance. Thus, it is easy to imag-
 ine situations in which efficiency within the
 context of the consensus belief interpreta-
 tion will not obtain. However, situations of
 this nature may be useful for explaining
 anomalies in the literature of efficient
 markets. The point of this paper is to dem-
 onstrate that the consensus belief interpreta-
 tion of market information efficiency is both
 viable and robust.
 APPENDIX
 SF= the risk-free security
 SR = the risky security
 SR'= the total supply of the risky secur-
 ity
 F= the risk-free rate of return
 R = the (uncertain) risky rate of re-
 turn
 i=the ith investor
 N= the total number of investors
 W = the endowed wealth of investor i
 SFj = the amount of investment in the
 risk-free security which is optimal
 for investor i
 SR= the amount of investment in the
 risky security which is optimal for
 investor i
 m-= the mean of the distribution of R
 prior to acquiring additional in-
 formation
 h=the precision of the distribution
 of R prior to acquiring additional
 information
 m= the mean of a sample of observa-
 tions from a process distributed
 normally with mean R and preci-
 sion h
 nh = the precision of a sample of n
 observations from a process dis-
 tributed normally with mean R
 and precision h
 m= the mean of the distribution of R
 posterior to acquiring additional
 information
 h=the precision of the distribution
 of R posterior to acquiring addi-
 tional information
 ri= the risk tolerance of investor i
 C(n) = the cost of sampling n observa-
 tions
 dN(I, p) =a normal density function with
 mean ,u and precision p
 vo=the value of the sum over all in-
 vestors of the product rihi
 n o(r) = the optimal number of sample
 observations acquired by an in-
 vestor with risk tolerance r
 H(r) = the optimal degree of precision
 attained by an investor with risk
 tolerance r, i.e., H(r)=h+no(r)h
 G(n, r)=the expected utility an investor
 with risk tolerance r achieves
 when he chooses n sample ob-
 servations.
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